The influence of international pressure on political repression in Xinjiang
Accepted for publication in Modern China, not yet published. Pre-peer-review version (different from the published one): https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=5474009.
Main argument: International pressure was a significant driver of China’s shifting approach to Xinjiang’s re-education camps ('vocational and education training centers'), shaping both narratives and policy choices, not just domestic factors.
Methodology: A process-tracing method based on a qualitative analysis of Chinese official documents, reports, leaked files, and media articles, and a content analysis of articles from Chinese official media.
Summary:
In response to growing international pressure, China moved through several stages: initially showing lax control over the narrative regarding the camps, then concealing the camps’ existence, subsequently acknowledging and justifying them, followed early afterwards by downsizing and reframing the policy, and eventually partially abandoning the practice.
The timing and inconsistency of shifts in official approaches, including those that contradicted earlier positions, together with explicit responses to international criticism, suggest that international pressure was a motivating factor behind these shifts.
The eventual decision to retreat from the policy was most likely shaped by a combination of international pressure and the perceived reduction of resistance and security threats.
Naming and shaming by researchers, NGOs, media, and Uyghur exile groups were considered at least same important for China as sanctions.
While many of the camps were physically closed, some were repurposed into other facilities. While some detainees were released, repression continues in different forms.
Main takeaways:
Even such consolidated authoritarian state as China adjusts to international pressure when reputational costs threaten its diplomatic, economic, and strategic goals.
These responses are often abrupt, not strategically calculated, and may have unintended consequences for the regime.
An authoritarian regime usually first attempts to deny the practice; if that does not work, it partly acknowledges it and often seeks to ‘legalise’ and justify it. If the pressure is persistent and consistent, the regime may implement policy shifts that can lead to a partial or complete termination of the repressive practice.
Non-material scrutiny ('naming and shaming') can be more powerful in triggering change than material sanctions.
Policy shifts may lead to certain improvements, but it does not mean that repression is over. The shift towards more ‘legal’ practices may make repression more difficult to uncover and prove.