The democratizing effects of ICT in China and imperfections of China's digital authoritarianism
Under review in Political Science Quarterly. Pre-peer-review version: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5474247.
Main argument:
China’s digital authoritarianism is sophisticated but imperfect. Information and communication technologies (ICT) continue to disrupt the regime, and the regime’s own adaptations to ICT create new vulnerabilities.
Methodology:
Analysis of documents (primarily official regulations, government documents, and media reports), applied to three sub-cases: the Covid-19 protests, repression in Xinjiang, and the crackdown on the tech sector. A theoretical framework links the disrupting effects of ICT (independent variable), the government’s adaptive strategies (intervening variables), and the resulting impact on regime stability (dependent variable).
Summary:
Evidence shows ICT may foster protest even in authoritarian states. Mechanisms: reduced costs of communication, faster coordination, spread of independent information, reduced trust in authorities.
Over time, regimes learned to adapt through information control, manipulation, surveillance, and digital governance, yet each of these mechanisms has its weaknesses.
Censorship can backfire. Governments allow partial openness to avoid backlash and preserve economic benefits, but this increases risks of cyberspeech cascades.
State propaganda is less persuasive than that of third parties such as influencers, but relying on third parties decreases control over content.
Digital surveillance creates dependence on private technology companies for expertise and infrastructure, increases the risk of large-scale data leaks and misuse of information in elite struggles, does not fully substitute the costs of physical violence, and can provoke backlash.
Digital governance increases transparency and provides tools to uncover regime flaws, while also nurturing more active citizens. Like digital surveillance, it relies on private technology companies and large-scale data collection, creating risks of dependence and data leaks.
Covid-19 protests: Despite censorship and surveillance, online cascades enabled nationwide mobilisation in 2022, forcing the state to both repress and partially concede by easing zero-Covid measures.
Xinjiang repression: Digital surveillance enabled mass detention of Uyghurs, but digital traces and leaks exposed the repression internationally, leading to sanctions and reputational costs for China.
Tech-sector crackdown: The rising power of tech firms, stemming partly from their participation in the regime, led to government concerns and a harsh crackdown, which then weakened the sector.
Main takeways:
China’s digital authoritarianism cannot be seen as a finished or flawless model of control.
Authoritarian adaptation to ICT involves trade-offs and generates unintended consequences.
Even the most advanced censorship cannot fully prevent online cascades and protest mobilisation.
Surveillance strengthens repression but simultaneously increases risks through data leaks and international exposure.
Digital governance makes the regime more efficient but also more transparent and vulnerable to scrutiny.
Digital authoritarianism relies on the tech sector, creating a dilemma: the stronger the digital control, the greater the regime’s reliance on tech companies and the higher the likelihood of alternative centres of power emerging.